Willful and Wanton-Identical in Meaning

"Willful" is defined in several appellate opinions in North Carolina, for example, in State v. Williams, 284 NC 67 (1973):
Ordinarily, "'[w]ilful' as used in criminal statutes means the wrongful doing of an act without justification or excuse, or the commission of an act purposely and deliberately in violation of law." State v. Arnold, 264 N.C. 348, 141 S.E.2d 473 (1965). "Wantonness . . . connotes intentional wrongdoing. . . . Conduct is wanton when in conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others." Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 28, 92 S.E.2d 393, 396-97 (1956). The attempt to draw a sharp line between a "wilful" act and a "wanton" act in the context of G.S. 14-34.1 would be futile. The elements of each are substantially the same.
That is, where the rights and safety of others are relevant, our law imposes a requirement of conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others.
In Williams, the Supreme Court construed G.S. 14.34.1, Discharging certain barreled weapons or a firearm into occupied property, which reads as follows: 
Any person who willfully or wantonly discharges or attempts to discharge:  
(1) Any barreled weapon capable of discharging shot, bullets, pellets, or other missiles at a muzzle velocity of at least 600 feet per second; or  
(2) A firearm  
into any building, structure, vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or other conveyance, device, equipment, erection, or enclosure while it is occupied is guilty of a Class E felony.  
The Court found Defendant guilty, but not before noting the requirement that Defendant know or have reason to believe his act might affect the rights or safety of others, construing "willfully or wantonly" to require this:
We hold that a person is guilty of the felony created by G.S. 14-34.1 if he intentionally, without legal justification or excuse, discharges a firearm into an occupied building with knowledge that the building is then occupied by one or more persons or when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the building might be occupied by one or more persons.
284 NC at 73.
In State v. Tanner, the Court of Appeals explained and clarified Williams, making clear that willfulness requires more than intent:
In State v. Williams, 21 N.C. App. 525, 204 S.E.2d 864 (1974)... The defendant argued that the "instruction equated wilful and wanton conduct with knowledge of occupancy of the building and attempted thereby to condense two separate elements of the crime into one."21 N.C. App. at 527. We found merit in his argument and held that the charge was erroneous, despite the fact that it was taken from "Pattern Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases in North Carolina." ..... As stated in Williams, a correct charge would provide that the accused would be guilty if the defendant intentionally, without legal justification or excuse, discharged a firearm into an occupied vehicle with knowledge that the vehicle was occupied by one or more persons or when he had reasonable grounds to believe that the vehicle might be occupied by one or more persons. 21 N.C. App. at 527. Defendant's assignment of error is sustained....

In State v. Brackett, 306 NC 138 (1982), the burning of a house, although for no legal purpose and plainly intentional, was held not "willful" precisely because the State's evidence did not meet the above requirement. The Court based its holding on Williams. Defendant had initially been convicted under G.S. 14-65:
If any person, being the occupant of any building used as a dwelling house, whether such person be the owner thereof or not, or, being the owner of any building designed or intended as a dwelling house, shall wantonly and willfully or for a fraudulent purpose set fire to or burn or cause to be burned, or aid, counsel or procure the burning of such building, he shall be punished as a Class H felon.  
Reversing the conviction, the Court cited Williams and stated: 
[F]for a burning of a dwelling to be criminal under G.S. 14-65 as a willful and wanton burning, it must be shown to have been done intentionally, without legal excuse or justification, and with the knowledge that the act will endanger the rights or safety of others or with reasonable grounds to believe that the rights or safety of others may be endangered.
306 NC at 142. The State failed to carry its burden because the house was on a large lot, other homes were not endangered, Defendant was home alone and she reported the fire. The public interest in not having the house destroyed could not make the burning "willful," despite the lack of any apparent legal motive and the suggestion of insurance fraud. 306 NC at 143.
Aside from the scienter requirement, the cases emphasize the fact that willfulness requires more than mere intention to commit an act. For example, Mathis v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 71 NC App 413 (1984) construes "willful refusal" under G.S. 20-16.2 as "the declination of a request or command, or the omission to comply with some requirement of law, as the result of a positive intention to disobey." This requires more than the intention to commit an act, and it requires more than simple negligence. Although the rights of others are not at issue in a willful refusal scenario, the use of the phrase "positive intention to disobey" is instructive.
As noted above, in both Williams and Brackett, the court also noted that "willful" and "wanton" are essentially identical in meaning.

--
Marcus E. Hill
311 E. Main St.
Durham, NC 27701 919-688-1941
fax:919-688-2426 cell:919-810-6975
marcus@marcusehill.com